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MAY THE BEST CANON WIN: 
LOCKHART V. UNITED STATES 




Among the Roberts Court’s most distinctive features is its 
consistent reliance on plain language when deciding cases of statutory 
interpretation.1 The practice was most recently exemplified in Lockhart 
v. United States,2 where in a colorful back-and-forth, the majority and 
dissenting opinions almost exclusively relied on plain language as they 
sought to resolve a circuit split. And while both opinions did address 
context and other factors as support, they did so only secondarily. 
The Court’s decision resolved a long-standing circuit split regarding 
18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), which triggers a mandatory minimum sentence 
for recidivists who have previously been convicted under a federal or 
state crime relating to “aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or 
abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.”3 It favored the 
reading of the Second Circuit and four other courts of appeals, holding 
that the mandatory minimum provision’s text and context together 
revealed a straightforward reading—that the modifying clause 
“involving a minor or ward” only modified the last crime in the series 
of predicate crimes.  
This “straightforward reading,” however, failed to be as obvious to 
the Court’s two dissenters, who used the same plain language approach 
to reach a wholly opposite result. As such, Lockhart indicates that even 
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 1.  David Strauss, The Plain Language Court, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 651, 651 (2016).  
 2.  Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016); see Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions 
and Bears, Judges and Legislators, And the Legacy of Justice Scalia, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 
907 (2016).  
 3.  18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) (2012).  
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with the consistent use of plain language, there can be inconsistencies 
in interpretation, and that a straightforward reading may not always be 
so straightforward. This commentary will explore the background of 
Lockhart, the arguments on both sides, and the Court’s holding. It will 
analyze the use of plain meaning in this case specifically, and attempt 
to reconcile how the same interpretation strategy can lead to such 
disparate results. All the while, this commentary will attempt to 
determine whether the Lockhart decision shows clandestine judicial 
activism, or whether it just indicates the different readings that can 
arise from the nuances of everyday language. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Petitioner Avondale Lockhart has two convictions on his record: 
the first was in 2000, when he was convicted of sexual abuse,4 and the 
second was in 2010, when he was arrested for possession of child 
pornography.5 Although the convictions would seem unrelated, 18 
U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) made the first conviction relevant to the second 
because it imposed upon Lockhart a mandatory minimum sentence of 
ten years. Section 2252(b)(2) reads in full: 
“Whoever violates, or attempts or conspires to violate [18 U.S.C. § 
2252(a)(4)] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than 10 years, or both, but . . . if such person has a prior conviction 
under this chapter, [other federal chapters . . .] or under the laws of 
any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive 
sexual conduct involving a minor or ward . . .such person shall be 
fined under this title and imprisoned for not less than 10 years nor 
more than 20 years.”6 
Based on his 2000 conviction, Lockhart was found to be subject to the 
mandatory minimum of ten-years imprisonment.7 
A.  Factual Background 
Lockhart was arrested for attempted receipt and possession of child 
pornography following a sting operation conducted by Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement agents and United States Postal Inspectors.8 
 
 4.  Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. at 961. 
 5.  Id. at 962.  
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Brief for Petitioner at 4, Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016) (No. 14-8358).  
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In 2010, Lockhart was mailed a letter “inviting him to purchase child 
pornography through a government-run website or mail order 
catalog.”9 His past had left him disabled and “addicted to readily 
available Internet pornography.”10 So he accepted the offer, purchasing 
six videos “depicting children as young as nine years old engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct.”11 Agents sought a warrant to search his 
residence and then conducted a “controlled delivery of a package 
purported to contain the videos” that Lockhart had ordered.12 
Following Lockhart’s acceptance of the package, agents executed the 
search warrant, where they found “more than 15,000 images and at 
least nine videos containing child pornography” at his residence.13 
B.  Procedural Background 
A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York indicted Lockhart, where he pleaded 
guilty to possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2252(a)(4)(B).14 His plea was conditioned on an agreement that he 
“preserved his right to appeal if the district court imposed a ten-year 
mandatory minimum sentence under Section 2252(b)(2).”15 
The district court did impose the mandatory minimum. It agreed 
with the probation office that the 2000 conviction of first-degree sexual 
abuse under New York law made Lockhart subject to the statutory 
minimum.16 In making its decision, the district court overruled 
Lockhart’s objection that section 2252(b)(2) “did not apply . . . because 
his prior conviction for first-degree sexual abuse did not involve a 
minor.”17 It explained that “the plain reading of the statute negates 
[Lockhart’s] position,” because the sexual assault offense “fits within 
th[e] part of [Section 2252(b)(2)] that speaks of a state conviction for 
aggravated sexual abuse.”18 Thus, in considering the sexual assault 
conviction as sufficient to impose section 2252(b)(2), the district court 
ruled that “involving a minor or ward” modifies only “abusive sexual 
 
 9.  Id.  
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Brief for Respondent at 10, Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. 958. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 11.  
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id.  
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conduct.” It does not modify “aggravated sexual abuse” or “sexual 
abuse,” as Lockhart argued. 
The Second Circuit affirmed.19 It held that “a sexual abuse 
conviction involving an adult victim constitutes a predicate offense” 
that imposes the ten-year mandatory minimum provided in section 
2252(b)(2).20 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately 
affirmed. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Congress first began regulating child pornography in 1978 with the 
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, which 
prohibited visual or print productions of minors engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct.21 Following the Supreme Court’s holdings in New 
York v. Ferber22 and Osborne v. Ohio,23 Congress has continued to 
expand substantive criminal provisions regarding child pornography.24 
These substantive provisions have always included sentencing 
enhancements.25 In 1996, the Court expanded sentencing 
enhancements to include state-law convictions.26 
The 1996 Act included a new provision within its recidivist 
enhancement list, stating that prior convictions “under the laws of any 
State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive 
sexual conduct involving a minor or ward” would also trigger the 
sentencing enhancements.27 But at the time, it did not include offenses 
under section 2252(b)(2). Instead, section (b)(2)’s state-law predicates  
 
 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978).  
 22.  See 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment permits states to prohibit 
the use of children in pornographic materials, whether the materials are obscene or not). 
 23.  See 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (holding that states can make possession of child pornography 
that involves actual children illegal).  
 24.  See e.g., Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4816 (1990).  
 25.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 5 (“The 1977 Act . . . increased the maximum 
sentence from ten to 15 years, if the offender had a prior conviction under ‘this section.’ . . . As 
the conduct prohibited by Section 2252(a) expanded to include the receipt of non-obscene child 
pornography in the [Child Protection Act of 1984], the reference to prior convictions under ‘this 
section’ in the recidivist enhancement expanded accordingly.”).  
 26.  Id. at 6.  
 27.  Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-30 (1996). 
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were added in 1998.28 The statutory minimum for recidivists convicted 
under (b)(2) was increased in 2003, from two to ten years.29 
Sections 2252(b)(1), 2252A(b)(1), and 2252A(b)(2) include almost 
identically-worded enhancement provisions. And four circuits in 
addition to the Second Circuit have held that in these provisions, 
“involving a minor or ward” only modifies the phrase immediately 
before it—“abusive sexual conduct.”30 The Eighth Circuit alone has 
reached a contrary result.31 
III. ARGUMENTS 
A.  Petitioner’s Arguments 
Lockhart presented three arguments to support his contention that 
the Second Circuit incorrectly decided his case. First, that under the 
series-qualifier principle, which applies a modifying clause to all 
integrated series in a list, “involving a minor or ward” modifies all three 
state-law predicates.32 Second, that “the statutory context, structure, 
and history” confirm this reading.33 Third, that if the Court still doubted 
the meaning of the statute, then the rule of lenity required that the law 
be interpreted in his favor.34 
Lockhart initially argued that the application of the series-qualifier 
principle was the proper canon to apply when reading the statute. If 
read with the series-qualifier principle in mind, the modifying clause 
“involving a minor or ward” would apply to all three state-law 
predicates. Because his prior conviction did not involve a minor or 
ward, the mandatory minimum was not triggered. The Supreme Court, 
he argued, “has long read statutes in light of the series-qualifier 
principle” when two textual signals are present.35 First, when the 
modifying phrase makes sense with all items in the series and second, 
 
 28.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 7.  
 29.  Id. at 8.  
 30.  See United States v. Mateen, 764 F.3d 627, 633 (6th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (per curiam); 
United States v. Spence, 661 F.3d 194, 197–98 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Hubbard, 480 F.3d 
341, 350 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Rezin, 322 F.3d 443, 448 (7th Cir. 2003).  
 31.  See United States v. Linngren, 652 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2011) (assuming that to trigger 
a prior state-law conviction, the “sexual abuse” predicate must require “the victim [to] be a 
minor”). 
 32.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 11. 
 33.  Id. at 22.  
 34.  Id. at 39.  
 35.  Id. at 12. 
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when the “modifying clause appears . . . at the end of a single, integrated 
list.”36 As applied to the relevant series in section 2252(b)(2), Lockhart 
argued that the modifier “involving a minor or ward . . . makes sense 
with all the terms in the series”37 and that the series “constitutes a 
‘single, integrated list’ of related elements” because “[s]ubstantively, all 
three items describe iterations of the same basic conduct, unlawful or 
wrongful sexual behavior.”38 He contended that both textual signals 
were present, and that the series-qualifier rule produced a “natural 
reading” that the modifier applied to the entire series.39 
Lockhart buttressed his initial argument with the “fundamental 
canon of statutory interpretation that the words of a statute must be 
read in their context with a view to their place in the overall statutory 
scheme.”40 He argued that Congress had drafted the list of state-law 
predicates to be narrower than the list of federal-law predicates.41 In 
supporting this argument, Lockhart suggested that the development of 
the list of predicate offenses shows Congress’s intent to not treat 
federal and state offense with parity.42 He contrasted the “generic” 
reach of the federal statutes, which “do not require the obscene matter 
to involve children” with specific language in the list of state-predicate 
crimes, which specifically criminalize “the production, possession, 
receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child 
pornography.”43 
Lockhart continued his argument by evaluating the legislative 
history of the statute. He argued that “[n]ot only has Congress always 
distinguished between prior federal and state convictions, it has done 
so by requiring the latter to involve children.” His argument noted that 
state-predicates were absent from the initial enactment of child 
pornography regulation in 1978.44 And he explained that when section 
2252(b)(2)’s state-predicates were added in 1996, so were section 
(b)(1)’s. The contemporaneous enactment of these provisions, 
 
 36.  Id. at 12 (quoting Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 543 U.S. 335, 344 n.4 (2005)).  
 37.  Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).  
 38.  Id. at 15–16. 
 39.  Id. at 12.  
 40.  Id. at 22 (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 309 (1989)). 
 41.  See id. at 23 (“It is true today, and has been true at all times since these provisions were 
enacted, that the qualifying federal convictions encompass more conduct than their state-law 
counterparts.”).  
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 26. 
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Lockhart argued, makes it reasonable to consider that the limiting 
factors of one section would apply to the other. So, because the state-
predicates in section (b)(1) are limited to state convictions “relating to 
the possession of child pornography,” Lockhart contended that the 
“more logical inference is that Congress limited all state-law predicates 
[including those in section (b)(2)] to offenses involving minors.”45 
As a Hail Mary, Lockhart’s last argument asserted that if the Court 
remained doubtful about the plain meaning of the statute, the ensuing 
ambiguity would require the Court to invoke the lenity doctrine.46 The 
doctrine “requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor 
of the defendants subjected to them”47 and should be deployed “once 
other legitimate tools of interpretation have been exhausted.”48 
Lockhart argued that the United States failed to “show[] that the 
statute’s recidivist enhancement unambiguously applies to him,”49 and 
that this failure mandated the application of the lenity doctrine.50 
“[A]pplying the enhanced penalties of § 2252(b)(2) . . . will have a 
serious and negative impact both on individual defendants and on our 
system of just and proportionate sentencing,” Lockhart argued.51 But, 
“[t]he rule of lenity [would] eliminate[] that risk.”52 
B.  Respondent’s Arguments 
The United States used three arguments to support its contention 
that the Second Circuit’s decision should be affirmed. First, it employed 
the last-antecedent rule, which provides that “a limiting clause or 
phrase should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or the 
phrase it immediately follows,”53 in interpreting section 2252(b)(2)’s 
state-law predicates, and argued that the rule results in a 
straightforward reading of the statute.54 Second, it examined the 
 
 45.  Id. at 27.  
 46.  Id. at 39. 
 47.  Id. (quoting United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (plurality opinion)). For a 
greater exploration of the rule of lenity’s application in the Court’s jurisprudence, see Nathan 
Greenblatt, How Mandatory Are Mandatory Minimums? How Judges Can Avoid Imposing 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 8 (2008).  
 48.  Id. at 40.  
 49.  Id. at 41.  
 50.  Id. at 43. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 14 (quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 
(2003)).  
 54.  Id. at 18.  
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context and drafting history of the statute to come to the conclusion 
that “Congress intended for the term . . . to modify only the last 
category of state sexual-abuse offenses.”55 Third, it rebuffed Lockhart’s 
use of the series-qualifier principle and lenity doctrine, arguing that 
after applying the last-antecedent rule and “considering the text, 
context, history, and purpose of Section 2252(b)(2), the meaning of the 
statute was clear, and that no grievous ambiguity justified the 
application of the rule of lenity.”56 
In arguing for the application of the last-antecedent rule, the 
United States urged that the principle be employed because “a limiting 
clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the 
noun or phrase that it immediately follows.”57 Thus, reading the phrase 
as it should ordinarily be read would “make especially good sense,” 
according to the United States.58 It argued that under common syntax 
rules, using a comma “indicates that qualifying language is applicable 
to all of the preceding clauses” but that section 2252(b)(2) used no 
comma to separate the modifying clause from the last antecedent.59 The 
United States contended that the absence of the comma “signal[ed] the 
contrary conclusion,” so the qualifying language only applies to 
“abusive sexual conduct.”60 
The United States then delved into the statutory context and 
drafting history of section 2252(b)(2) to buttress its argument. It argued 
that section (b)(2)’s federal-law predicates covered crimes “that may 
have either minor or adult victims,”61 and as such, its state-law 
predicates predictably also would cover a range of crimes including 
minor and adult victims.62 The United States then supplied additional 
evidence that, of section (b)(2)’s federal-law predicates, three crimes 
similar to the state-law predicates were included. “Section 2241 
prohibits ‘aggravated sexual abuse,’ Section 2242 prohibits ‘sexual 
abuse,’ and Section 2243 prohibits ‘sexual abuse of a minor or ward.’”63 
Thus, it argued that “[t]he strong similarity between those three federal 
 
 55.  Id. at 15.  
 56.  Id. at 16.  
 57.  Id. at 18 (quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003)).  
 58.  Id. at 19–20. 
 59.  Id. at 20. 
 60.  Id. at 19–20. 
 61.  Id. at 21. 
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Id. at 22.  
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statutes and the three categories of state sexual-abuse crimes listed in 
Section 2252(b)(2) . . . is persuasive evidence that Congress intended to 
capture prior state law convictions for ‘aggravated sexual abuse’ and 
‘sexual abuse’ involving adult victims.”64 If Congress had intended to 
limit state-law predicates, the United States argued, its drafting history 
and use of similar federal-law predicates would have made that clear.65 
Thus, under application of the last-antecedent rule, and with context 
and drafting history in mind, the United States argued that section 
2252(b)(2) was unambiguous and that the modifying clause “of a minor 
or ward” was only a limiting factor for abusive sexual conduct. 
After concluding that there was no ambiguity with the statute, the 
United States concluded its argument with some parting shots at 
Lockhart’s positions. It argued that Lockhart’s series-qualifier 
principle would render the second state-predicate superfluous66 and 
was inappropriate because section (b)(2) “does not contain an 
integrated list.”67 According to the United States, the list could not be 
seen as integrated when the second and third state-predicates were 
identical.68 It argued that the “difference between a list containing 
distinct words that are similar or ‘overlapping’ in meaning and one 
containing two phrases that bear the identical is substantial.”69 This is 
especially true in a case where the “textual signal” of an integrated, but 
not identical, list is required in order to apply the series-qualifier 
principle.70 
The United States then addressed the other indicia presented by 
Lockhart to support application of the series-qualifier principle.71 It 
argued that Lockhart was unable to show that the series-qualifier 
principle was more reasonable to use than the last-antecedent rule.72 It 
supported this contention by arguing that neither the drafting history 
 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 24–25. 
 66.  Id. at 32–33 (“Petitioner concedes that [under the series-qualifier principle] the second 
and third categories are identical. . . . [A]nd his interpretation therefore runs up against the 
presumption against surplusage.”).  
 67.  Id. at 34.  
 68.  Id. at 35.  
 69.  Id. 
 70.  See id. at 40–48 (arguing that “Petitioner’s view of drafting history is misconceived,” and 
that the “scant history of the recidivist enhancement . . . provides no basis” for Petitioner’s 
legislative history argument).  
 71.  Id. at 37.  
 72.  Id.  
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nor the legislative history provided any support for the belief that the 
series-qualifier principle led to a more reasonable reading of the 
statute.73 Finally, the United States argued that Lockhart’s request to 
apply the rule of lenity should be rejected.74 As it stated, “[t]he rule of 
lenity is a tie-breaking rule of statutory construction” – but in the 
United States’ eyes, there was no tie.75 
IV.  HOLDING 
In a 7–2 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit 
and held in favor of the United States’ reading of section 2252(b)(2).76 
It found that the modifying phrase “involving a minor or ward” only 
applied to the last state-law predicate in the series, “sexual abusive 
conduct.”77 And its decision confirmed that Lockhart’s 2000 sexual 
assault conviction was a qualifying state-law predicate that triggered 
the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. Both the majority and 
dissenting opinions, in expected fashion, stuck closely to the statutory 
text and interpreted it according to its plain meaning. Nevertheless, 
they came to conflicting conclusions. 
Following its precedent, the Court applied the last antecedent rule 
to the statute’s text and held that in conjunction with the statute’s 
context, there was only one “straightforward reading.”78 In applying the 
rule, the Court noted that last antecedent rule is a “timeworn” method, 
applied “from [the Court’s] earliest decisions to [its] more recent,” and 
that its application is most appropriate when “it takes more than a little 
mental energy to process the individual entries in the list, making it a 
heavy lift to carry the modifier across them all.”79 As an illustration of 
its reasoning, the majority provided this quip: 
[I]magine you are the general manager of the Yankees and you are 
rounding out your 2016 roster. You tell your scouts to find a 
defensive catcher, a quick-footed shortstop, or a pitcher from last 
year’s World Champion Kansas City Royals. It would be natural for 
your  scouts  to  confine  their  search  for  a  pitcher  to  last  year’s   
 
 73.  See generally id. at 37–49 (arguing that Petitioner had failed to provide persuasive 
evidence to rebut the presumption of applying the last-antecedent rule).  
 74.  Id. at 49. 
 75.  Id.  
 76.  Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016). 
 77.  Id. at 961. 
 78.  Id. at 962. 
 79.  Id. at 962–63. 
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championship team, but to look more broadly for catchers and 
shortstops.80 
To carry the modifier “World Champion Kansas City Royals” 
across the entire series would be a “heavy lift.”81 And it is better read 
with the basic intuition that the modifier only affects the last 
antecedent in the series—the pitcher. As such, the Court held that when 
interpreting section 2252(b)(2), a similar reading should apply.82 
The Court then examined the context of the statute and the series-
qualifier rule proposed by Lockhart.83 But through the rest of its 
analysis, it remained committed to the plain meaning of the words. For 
example, even when considering the context of the provision, the Court 
compared section (b)(2)’s language to other similarly drafted 
provisions.84 And although it technically examined the context of the 
statute, it merely looked at how the other “sections mirror precisely the 
order, precisely the divisions, and nearly precisely the words. . . .”85 
The Court did, in fairness, also address some other indicia in making 
its decision, including a Senate report and a letter from the Department 
of Justice.86 But again, it closely analyzed the language of the report and 
letter, inevitably determining that neither indicia was enough to 
overcome the application of the last antecedent rule. Finally, the Court 
addressed Lockhart’s lenity doctrine argument, stating that it was 
inapplicable in this case because the lenity doctrine only applies “when 
the ordinary canons of statutory construction have revealed no 
satisfactory construction.”87 Here, the Court found the last antecedent 
rule to be satisfactory, so the lenity doctrine did not apply.88 
The dissent similarly engaged in plain-meaning interpretation, but 
argued on behalf of Lockhart that the series-qualifier rule was better 
applied to the statute. It began its opinion with three equally colorful 
examples: 
 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  See id. at 963–66.  
 84.  Id. at 966.  
 85.  Id. at 964 (emphasis added). 
 86.  Id. at 967.  
 87.  Id. at 968.  
 88.  Id. 
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Imagine a friend told you that she hoped to meet “an actor, director, 
or producer involved with the new Star Wars movie.” You would 
know immediately that she wanted to meet an actor from the Star 
Wars cast—not an actor in, for example, the latest Zoolander. 
Suppose a real estate agent promised to find a client “a house, 
condo, or apartment in New York.” Wouldn’t the potential buyer be 
annoyed if the agent sent him information about condos in 
Maryland or California? And consider a law imposing a penalty for 
the “violation of any statute, rule, or regulation relating to insider 
trading.” Surely a person would have cause to protest if punished 
under that provision for violating a traffic statute. The reason in all 
three cases is the same: Everyone understands that the modifying 
phrase—“involved with the new Star Wars movie,” “in New York,” 
“relating to insider trading”—applies to each term in the preceding 
list, not just the last.89 
The dissent then made its point clear that the series-qualifier principle 
was better suited for deciding this case than the last antecedent rule. 
The dissent continued making this point through a painstakingly close 
analysis of previous cases where the last antecedent rule had applied, 
and then distinguished them from Lockhart.90 It finally concluded its 
scrutiny with the opinion that the statute, when applying the series-
qualifier principle, “reflects the completely ordinary way that people 
speak and listen, write and read.”91 
The dissent then addressed other indicia that supported application 
of the series-qualifier principle to the statute. It reviewed the legislative 
history and examined the structural similarities between the state 
predicates and the federal ones. It then made its most salient point—
that the rule of lenity should undoubtedly apply here. In its final 
argument, the dissent proffered an assumption—that maybe neither 
the series-qualifier principle, nor the last antecedent rule actually 
resolves the case as clearly as either side has argued.92 “What to do?” 
the dissent asked. Its answer was simple: “This Court has a rule for how 
to resolve genuine ambiguity in criminal statutes: in favor of the 
criminal defendant.”93 
 
 89.  Id. at 969.  
 90.  See id. at 969–73.  
 91.  Id. at 970.  
 92.  Id. at 977.  
 93.  Id. (emphasis added).  
SHAIKH FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 3/23/2017  8:15 PM 
2017] MAY THE BEST CANON WIN 215 
 
V.  ANALYSIS 
Although the Court ultimately made a clear decision that has 
already been favored by a majority of the courts of appeals, its method 
in reaching it may not be as straightforward as the majority contended 
it was. If a plain reading of the statute were all that was required of the 
Court, it would not have led to the passionate debate between the 
majority and dissent. Nor would it have led to the initial circuit split. 
Further, if the reading of the language were as “straightforward” as the 
majority held, then questions about the appropriate reading of the 
statute and the application of the lenity doctrine would not have 
remained. The Court did however apply the most reasonable reading 
of section 2252(b)(2). 
However, Lockhart revealed two important points about the Court: 
first, that it will likely continue to steadfastly apply statutory 
interpretation to determine the plain meaning whenever possible; and 
second, that it has the skilled ability to cloak judicial activism behind 
the veil of statutory interpretation. The Lockhart decision puts a new 
burden on legal academics and practitioners who read statutory 
interpretation cases to make sure that the interpretation is not just the 
product of an active bench. 
The Roberts’ Court’s consistent use of the plain language approach 
is well documented.94 And its shift to the close reading of words can be 
largely attributed to the late Justice Scalia.95 But in the context of 
Lockhart’s inquiry, both the majority and dissent bent over backwards 
to ensure that they remain steadfast on their quests for the plain 
meaning of section 2252(b)(2). Although both opinions did address 
other indicia, such as the lenity doctrine, the bulk of both opinions 
revolved around an inquiry into the language and timely examples of 
how the statute should be read. 
However, even as the opinions explored the meaning of the statute 
and continued to resort to common statutory principles, a reader 
cannot help but recognize that a majority of the arguments were self-
serving. Under the façade of reading the statute for its plain meaning, 
the opinions developed their own proof (in the form of examples) to 
back their assertions. 
 
 
 94.  Strauss, supra note 1, at 651–52.  
 95.  Id. 
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One possible explanation for the circular reasoning of both 
opinions lies behind the veil of judicial activism—the “notoriously 
slippery term” that has “become increasingly unclear” for students, 
practitioners, and academics over the last few decades.96 But despite the 
inability of most scholars and judges to define the amorphous term, 
judicial activism can certainly be seen when it is used on the bench. This 
is the case in Lockhart, where both opinions seemed to have selected 
their method of interpretation based on beliefs made prior to hearing 
the arguments. And then, the opinions applied statutory interpretation 
principles to section 2252(b)(2) that best conformed to their belief of 
what the statute means. 
This is most clearly seen in the majority’s dismissal of the 
application of the lenity doctrine in preference of the last-antecedent 
rule. Although it attempted to make the interpretation a clear-cut case, 
that two Justices read the statute differently is a clear indication that 
the language may not be as clear as the majority contended. In cases 
like this, as the dissent noted, criminal law precedent has established a 
rule for murky statute interpretation—side with the defendant. But 
even with this timeworn doctrine in hand, the Court refused to apply it 
because it preferred the outcome of the last-antecedent rule. 
Judicial activism is certainly a possibility when one is reminded of 
the serious nature of the crimes Lockhart committed. Although both 
opinions used humorous and timely examples about Star Wars and the 
World Championship, at the heart of the case is a man who has 
committed one of society’s most shameful crimes—the exploitation of 
young children. Thus, had the Court held differently, Lockhart would 
have been a free man within just a few years. So, even if the plain 
meaning was crystal clear in applying to all three of the state-law 
predicates, it would not be unreasonable to believe that the Court 
would dispense its own sense of justice to ensure that society’s morals 
were protected. 
Activism could also be suspected in the case of the dissenters, who 
likely recognized that the series-qualifier principle would help them 
eliminate a troubling and uniquely American criminal punishment—
mandatory minimums. By reading the statute in favor of Lockhart, the 
dissenters were able to make both a political statement and remain 
 
 96.  Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism,” 92 CAL. L. 
REV. 1441, 1442 (2004). 
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consistent in their plain language approach. However, behind that veil, 
it is likely that there were some political ambitions driving the decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court in Lockhart remained a steadfast adherent of plain 
meaning statutory interpretation, but its decision suggests that more 
than just the language of the statute played into its decision. Cases such 
as Lockhart demonstrate that not even the Supreme Court is immune 
from judicial activism, but they open discussion on whether judicial 
activism is as dangerous of a threat as past academics have crafted it to 
be. An active bench can certainly use their political preferences to drive 
their decisions, and continue to cage those decisions within well-
developed legal principles. In the case of Lockhart, the question will 
remain: what happened behind the closed doors of One First Street? 
